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ABSTRACT 
We study the impact of violent conflict on social capital, as measured by citizen 
participation in community groups, defined by four activity types: governance, social 
service, infrastructure development and risk-sharing. Combining household panel data 
from Indonesia with conflict event information, we find an overall decrease in citizen 
contributions in districts affected by group violence in the early post-Suharto transition 
period.  
However, participation in communities with a high degree of ethnic polarization is less 
affected, and is even stimulated for local governance and risk-sharing activities. 
Moreover, individual engagement appears to depend on the involvement of other 
members from the same ethnic group, which points toward building of intra-ethnic 
social networks in the presence of violence.  
Finally, our results show the danger of generalization when dealing with citizen 
participation in community activities. We find a large variety of responses depending on 
the activity and its economic and social functions. We also find large observed and 
unobserved individual heterogeneities of the effect of violence on participation. Once an 
appropriate nomenclature of activities is used and controls for heterogeneity are applied, 
we find that the ethnic and social configuration of society is central in understanding 
citizen participation. 
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1. Introduction 
Scholars and practitioners increasingly advocate bottom-up development 
approaches based on the active involvement of citizens. Local groups and networks 
thereby make a difference especially when state and market institutions are absent or 
non-functional. For instance, community initiatives can help to overcome shortages in 
the provision of local public goods and services. In the absence of formal credit and 
insurance markets, networks of mutual assistance also allow for productive investments 
and mitigation of income shocks.
1
 
However, the well-known incentive problems that plague collective action also 
exist at the local level. And although an extensive literature has investigated collective 
incentives, the understanding of the inefficiencies in local collective action is still quite 
limited.
2
  
Collective action suffers not only from inefficiencies, but also from diverse 
external shocks that may unbalance local institutions. A specific kind of shocks is 
related to violent conflicts. This paper addresses an issue that has attracted relatively 
little attention in the literature. Using household and community panel data from 
Indonesia, we study potential impacts of violence on citizen participation in a diverse 
set of community groups. Looking at the impact of violence on community activities 
thereby informs us about hidden mechanisms and determinants of local collective action 
in the Indonesian context. 
It is well admitted that violent conflict may disrupt markets and economic 
contracts, in particular by jeopardizing property rights and destroying capital and 
organizations. From a theoretical standpoint, Lavie and Muller (2011a, 2011b) have 
shown how income opportunities occurring in violent environments may incite 
individuals to give up their usual productive activities in order to participate in fighting 
instead. Micro-level studies find that heightened insecurity in conflict areas severely 
impedes market access of local producers (e.g., Verpoorten, 2009, for Rwandan cattle 
markets). On a more global scale, the substantial decline in market exchange is 
illustrated by a huge slump in international trade flows in those countries affected by 
conflict (Blomberg and Hess, 2006). It is less known whether and how violence affects 
community group activities. This is notably important because if such activities show a 
                                                 
1
 More general effects of citizen participation in local groups on economic growth have been advocated 
by Putman (1993), based on a comparison of Northern and Southern Italy. However, Knack and Keefer 
(1997), using data on 29 market economies from the World Value Survey, do not find any significant 
effect of these activities on growth. This debate is hence still open. 
2
 See Lin and Nugent (1995), and Banerjee, Yyer and Somanathan (2008) for overviews. 
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higher resistance to violence than market institutions, they could replace markets in 
some drastic contexts. 
In general, civil wars are likely to severely rupture the social fabric of society. 
Colleta and Cullen (2000) provide case study evidence from Cambodia, Guatemala, 
Rwanda, and Somalia that illustrates how social cohesion and communal trust can be 
eroded in societies plagued by civil war. However, conclusions on a generally negative 
effect of violent conflict on social cohesion and political participation have been called 
into question. Using national account data from Uganda, Collier (1999) distinguishes 
war-vulnerable and war-safe activities. In their micro-level study on the impact of the 
Sierra Leone civil war on post-conflict collective action, Bellows and Miguel (2009) 
find direct victims of war violence to be politically and socially more engaged in their 
communities than non-victims. Specifically, conflict victimization is shown to 
positively affect participation in community meetings, voter registration, and 
membership in social groups.
3
 Moreover, Bellow and Miguel‟s study stands out of the 
rest of the literature in that they find that neither ethnic nor religious divisions played a 
central role for citizen participation in Sierra Leone. 
Individual engagement is sometimes assumed to arise from the personal 
experience of violence, rather than from “merely witnessing” it. For example, Blattman 
(2009) finds that abducted ex-combatants in Northern Uganda show increased political 
participation (measured by voting, being a community activist, and political 
employment) after their return. However, the formerly abducted show neither greater 
involvement in social and religious groups nor higher contributions to local public 
goods.  
Even if the literature generally shows violence exposure to be detrimental to 
social and economic behaviour, social links may as well be reinforced. This is 
confirmed by laboratory experiments in Nepal and Burundi. Using behavioural games, 
Gilligan, Pascuale and Samii (2010) find a greater willingness to invest in trust-based 
transactions and to contribute to public goods in those communities that were 
particularly affected by violence during the Nepalese civil war. Similarly, Voors et al. 
(2012) study behavioural changes in post-war Burundi and find evidence for increased 
altruism by both individuals and communities that experienced violence during the 
1993-2005 civil conflict. These contradictory findings suggest that further empirical 
                                                 
3 
 In this paper, social groups correspond to women‟s groups, youth groups, and farmer‟s groups 
(Bellows and Miguel, 2009, p. 1149). 
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investigations are needed to better understand the actual mechanisms through which 
violence interacts with social behaviour, notably citizen participation. 
Interestingly, such pro-social behaviour found in experiments appears less 
distinct in those war-affected communities that are ethnically heterogeneous. In a game-
theoretical approach, Choi and Bowles (2007) argue that parochial altruism, i.e. 
altruistic behaviour toward fellow group members and hostility toward other groups, is 
a dominant evolutionary strategy during inter-group conflict. Further laboratory 
experimental evidence on this dark side of social capital comes from Bauer, Cassar and 
Chytilova (2011). In dictator game experiments with Georgian children shortly after the 
2008 war with the Russian Federation over Ossetia, war-related experiences are shown 
to increase one‟s sense of group identity.  
While within-group ties (“bonding social capital”) tend to be strengthened in 
settings of violence, cooperation across group boundaries (“bridging social capital”) 
may be weakened when inter-group tensions increase. Varshney (2001) describes the 
role of local networks during communal violence in India and stresses the opposite 
effects of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic engagement. Local fieldwork conducted by 
Pinchotti and Verwimp (2007) in rural Rwanda illustrates how social relations between 
Hutu and Tutsi were most collapsed in the presence of extreme violence, while social 
ties within the ethnic groups were strengthened. Using cross-sectional data from opinion 
surveys among Ugandan households, Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti (2011) find 
intensive fighting to decrease general trust and increase ethnic identity. 
Then, examining the role of ethnicity and social classes on citizen participation 
appears to be a useful lead. Most literature in this field does not examine the role of 
violence or conflict. Baland and Platteau (1997), for instance, develop theoretical 
models exhibiting the ambiguous impact of wealth inequality on the efficiency of the 
equilibrium outcome for social groups. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) study group 
formation and participation for heterogeneous populations in the US in terms of 
ethnicity and income. For a wide range of community activities, they find that 
participation is lower in more unequal or ethnically fragmented localities. Using cross-
sectional data from Tanzania, La Ferrara (2002) finds that increasing inequality has an 
ambiguous effect on group membership for diverse social and economic groups, 
depending on the type of access rule and the location of disparity changes in the wealth 
distribution. From a more general perspective, Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1993) link 
heterogeneous preferences across ethnic groups to public goods, and validate this link 
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for US urban areas. This link between group activities and the generation of public 
goods needs to be explored further. Moreover, other dimensions of heterogeneity, such 
as age groups, education levels and social classes, could be incorporated in such 
approaches. Gugerty and Kremer (2008) show for Kenya that outside funding changes 
group membership, thereby weakening the role of the disadvantaged. Campbell (2009) 
finds that education correlates with greater civic engagement in the U.S., in part because 
it is a marker of social status during elections. Using cross-sectional data from Senegal 
and Burkina-Faso, Arcand and Fafchamps (2012) find that, on average, the more 
fortunate members of rural societies are more likely to take part in community-based 
organisations. They also find some evidence of positive assorting according to distance, 
ethnicity, wealth and household size. Finally, Attanasio et al. (2012) use experimental 
data from 70 Columbian communities to show that close friends and relatives are likely 
to join the same risk pooling group. 
Robust evidence on the various relationships between conflict violence (and 
other shocks) on the one hand, and social capital on the other hand, is still scarce. In 
part, this is because many studies are based on qualitative knowledge, cross sections, 
small and/or non-representative samples, laboratory experimental designs rather than 
actually observed choices, as well as on proxy behaviour such as political activities (as 
in De Luca, 2011). We deal with these limitations in this paper by using large, 
representative panel data on actual choices for an extended set of activities. 
Moreover, relatively little is known about the social consequences of less severe, 
low intensity forms of conflict, at least when moving away from laboratory experiments 
or theoretical settings. The analysis of low conflict intensity contexts is important 
because it allows studying more permanent types of groups, as opposed to severe 
conflicts, such as fully fledged wars, that destroy most institutions and often leave little 
to observe. In this paper, the focus is on following stable institutions throughout their 
history, which includes violence spans, as opposed to looking at participation in new 
institutions emerging after a war, which is what much of the current literature does.  
For Indonesia, Madden and Barron (2002) document the social impact of 
sporadic, but widespread violence in the province of Lampung after the 1998 fall of the 
New Order regime. They report a mixed effect of how spontaneous violence, armed 
robbery, and vigilantism affect local relations and networks. While within-group 
cooperation increased, social interactions across ethnic groups deteriorated. Chen 
(2010) tests a model in which group identity in the form of religious intensity plays the 
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role of ex-post insurance, after the 1997-98 Indonesian economic crisis. However, the 
link between violence in the immediate post-Suharto era and local social relations has 
not been analysed quantitatively. We fill this gap with hard empirical evidence in this 
paper.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes 
the data and provides background information on community activities in Indonesia. We 
then turn to our estimation strategy in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss our empirical 
results from the regression analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Data 
2.1. Community Participation Data 
Local mutual cooperation has a long tradition in Indonesia (Bowen, 1986). The 
New Order regime used to mobilize the underlying ethic (gotong royong) of this 
tradition to encourage development strategies based on collective solidarity and 
reciprocity. Local development initiatives were also a response to rising inequality 
(Cameron, 2000) and the lasting impacts of the 1998 financial crisis on poverty 
(Ravallion and Lokshin, 2007). Such development initiatives were intensified by the 
2001 Decentralization Laws that transferred many public and social decisions to local 
institutions.  
We study the functioning of these local groups using data from the Indonesian 
Family Life Survey (IFLS), a large-scale, longitudinal household and community survey 
representative of about 83 per cent of the Indonesian population
4
 (Strauss et al., 2004). 
Using single waves of the IFLS data, Beard (2005, 2007) provides an insightful 
overview of the Indonesian context in her discussion of citizen engagement in local 
groups. She focuses on time and money spent to the benefit of these groups, rather than 
on mere participation. Specifically, we use the second (IFLS2 in 1997) and the third 
wave (ILFS3 in 2000) of the IFLS. This allows us to capture information contemporary 
to the 1997 financial crisis and the outbreak of violence in the aftermath of President 
Suharto‟s resignation in May 1998. 
Since the conflict data we draw on is not available for those Indonesian 
provinces with negligible levels of communal violence (see Sub-Section 2.2.), our 
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 The IFLS includes all provinces of Java, the provinces of North, West, and South Sumatra, and 
Lampung on Sumatra, the islands of Bali and Nusa Tenggara Barat, as well South Sulawesi and South 
Kalimantan. The least densely populated regions and the conflict provinces of Aceh, Malukku and East 
Timor were excluded for cost efficiency and security reasons, respectively. 
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analysis focuses on the main island of Java, the islands of West Nusa Tenggara, and the 
province of South Sulawesi. This provides us with a sample of 15,508 adult respondents 
from 5,026 households, of which 9,466 individuals are observed in both selected IFLS 
waves. The community survey additionally offers detailed information on the 
characteristics of the 197 communities in the sample. An IFLS community/village refers 
to an enumeration area (EA) that was randomly chosen from a nationally representative 
sample frame used in the 1993 SUSENAS (National Household Survey). Each EA 
includes between 200 and 300 households (Strauss et al., 2004). The fact that we avail 
of a representative sample for a large population is important as it is rare in this 
literature, where most micro-studies are either concentrated geographically or 
correspond to non-random, small laboratory sets of subjects. 
During the second IFLS wave, in 1997, a module on citizen participation was 
included for the first time. It provides information on individual participation in nine 
different community-level activities. These activities can be grouped into four (mutually 
non-exclusive) categories: local governance organizations, social services, infrastructure 
development initiatives and mutual insurance groups.  
The first category of local governance organizations comprises community 
meetings and the women associations (Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, PKK). 
Community meetings are held at different local levels and are usually led by an elected 
local resident. They provide a platform to discuss issues relevant to the community and 
to decide collectively on strategies for action. The women associations can be seen as 
related insofar as the wife of the Community Meeting leader is automatically the head 
of the PKK. While concerned with any issue of local planning, the PKK deals in 
particular with the organization of public services, such as informal education or health 
counselling, which are provided by and for members of the neighbourhood. 
The PKK, therefore, is also included in the second category of social services. 
Additionally, this category includes the mother and child health post organizations 
(Posyandu) and voluntary labour groups. Posyandu provides primary health care for 
young children, including monthly check-ups, vaccination and nutritional supplements, 
and trains mothers in health and parenting good practices. In return for their service, 
participating mothers are expected to make administrative or financial contributions. 
Voluntary labour activities include aspects of both environmental development and 
social services. The mission of the most common activity, the “Clean Friday 
Movement”, is to clean the village‟s public facilities and roads. As the PKK and 
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Posyandu exclusively address women issues, we restrict the sample to female 
respondents for this category. 
A couple of activities recorded in the IFLS refer to provision of public 
infrastructure. The Kampung Improvement Program (KIP) started as a slum-upgrading 
project in Jakarta and Surabaya in 1968. It was subsequently expanded nationally. It 
provides investments in physical infrastructure, such as public facilities, roads, drains 
and water supply. While the focus of KIP is on urban agglomerations, the Kecamatan 
Development Program (KDP) follows a similar approach in poor rural communities. 
Two further IFLS community activities, the provision of systems for drinking water and 
for garbage disposal, aim at developing local infrastructure. Since most of these 
initiatives are typically considered by Indonesians to be „male‟ activities, the sample is 
restricted to men for this category. 
The two remaining activities share aspects of mutual insurance and mutual 
protection: Ronda, on the one hand, describes informal security systems organized at 
neighbourhood or even street level. Supplementing the police, members of these groups 
carry out voluntary patrols at night to enhance safety within the community. 
Cooperatives, on the other hand, which may correspond to very diverse types of 
cooperation, regroup the other risk-sharing activities captured in the survey. While we 
subsume these two activities under the umbrella of „mutual insurance‟, we analyse them 
separately given their distinct economic functions. Table 1 offers an overview of the 
categories and provides further information on the included activities. 
 
2.2. Conflict Data 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis and the subsequent resignation of President 
Suharto in May 1998 were accompanied by a period of violent conflicts. Aside from the 
separatist conflict in Aceh and the ethno-religious conflicts in the Moluccas and Central 
Sulawesi, communal violence of different intensities affected other parts of the country 
as well (see Wilson, 2005, for a national overview).  
For the quantitative analysis of these conflicts, we use the United Nations 
Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR)-II Database, which reports 
incidents of group violence in 14 Indonesian provinces for the 1990-2003 period. Based 
on a survey of regional newspapers, UNSFIR-II covers “violence perpetrated by a group 
on another group (as in riots), by a group on an individual (as in lynching), by an 
individual on a group (as in terrorist acts), by the state on a group, or by a group on 
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organs or agencies of the state” (Varshney, Panggabean, Tadjoeddin, 2004; p. 7). Hence 
incidents of “ordinary crime”, such as robbery or murder, are not included. 
We use conflict deaths as an indicator of severity and aggregate the number of 
fatalities at district level, as in many cases a more detailed localization of violence is not 
possible. This implies that we do not deal with direct exposure to violence at individual 
level and direct interaction with individual decisions, which would certainly be 
insignificant in this sample since the probability of an individual to directly suffer from 
violence is very small therein. The resulting conflict indices are then combined with the 
IFLS data, which leaves us with six provinces covered by both IFLS and UNSFIR-II: 
West Java, Central Java, East Java, and Jakarta on Java, West Nusa Tenggara and South 
Sulawesi. These six provinces account for more than 60 per cent of the total number of 
conflict incidents reported by UNSFIR-II, but were relatively unaffected by highly 
destructive, fatal violence. Given that we mainly focus on Java and exclude the religious 
violence in the Moluccas and the separatist‟s conflicts, the conflict type should be 
relatively homogeneous in our sample, as far as we can make distinctions about this. 
Our attempts to disaggregate the violence information into several categories led to too 
few observations to be useful. Table 3 presents summary statistics for the different 
conflict indicators used in the regression analysis. 
 
 
3. The Econometric Approach 
The analysis of the determinants of individual participation is conducted 
separately for each activity category, as well as for security organizations and 
cooperatives. The propensity of individual i to participate in a certain community 
activity, k, in community j and year t is dependent on the expected net benefit from 
involvement, B
*
: 
 
Bijtk
∗ = Xitβ + Vjtγ + Rjδ + Ttφ + ai + vt−1,dϑ + εit , (1) 
 
where Xit is a vector of individual and household characteristics, Vjt a vector of 
village characteristics, Rj and Tt are province and time dummies, ai denotes an 
unobserved individual effect, εit is an idiosyncratic error term with mean zero, and β, γ, 
δ, φ,  represent parameter vectors. The main independent variable of interest is the 
indicator of conflict, vt-1,d, which measures lagged violence at district level. While the 
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expectations on net benefits are unknown, we observe the individual participation 
choice, Pitk, which equals 1 (participation) if the expected net benefit is positive, and 
zero (no participation) otherwise: 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑘 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑘
∗ > 0, 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒. (2) 
 
 
An alternative interpretation is that of internal/external selection rules based on 
observable and unobservable individual and local characteristics. Mixed decision 
processes by applicants and insiders, as for example in La Ferrara‟s (2000) model, are 
therefore encompassed in our setting. 
A Random Effects (RE) logit model is applied to estimate (1)-(2). This approach 
enables us to exploit the panel structure of the data so as to account for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity that might affect individual engagement. This is potentially 
important as many participation decisions may be grounded in stable individual 
characteristics beyond observation possibilities, such as personality, family background, 
or past personal events. With the RE approach, we expect to achieve a better 
determination of the studied phenomena and a better control for omitted variables than 
in cross-section estimation approaches. Note that fixed-effect estimation is not possible 
in our case as it would correspond to many perfect participation predictions for 
individuals not changing their participation choice in the observed period. Moreover, 
introducing fixed-effects for districts is not a fruitful approach here, as we would lose 
the conflict variables (and other district variables of interest) that are constructed at 
district level. 
The determinants of individual participation are estimated conditionally on 
individual knowledge of the activity‟s existence. This may introduce a selection bias if 
the group of informed respondents differs from the group of the excluded individuals 
unaware of the activities. However, the restriction on individuals reporting knowledge is 
informative in itself, thus helping us focusing on the link between prevalent violence 
and people‟s decision to engage in their community. For robustness and comparison, we 
also run the analysis on the full sample. 
The fact that we estimate separate models for different, non-exclusive activities 
implies that we cannot test hypotheses involving coefficient estimates from different 
activity equations. However, the coefficient estimators are still consistent. While some 
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efficiency could be gained by simultaneous estimation of all equations, this is not 
necessary here as the sample size is large enough to yield efficient estimates. 
As respondents are asked for their participation in the twelve months prior to the 
interview, we define violence as the number of fatalities in the two-year period one year 
before the reference period of the IFLS interview.
5
 Lagging the conflict variables in that 
way should mitigate concerns of reverse causality from community participation to 
violence. We expect this lagging strategy to help address the potential endogeneity 
issues. Moreover, there is no serious endogeneity issue related to the potential 
emergence or disappearance of activities (e.g., security groups) at village level in 
conflict times, as all considered activities are found existent in almost 100 per cent of 
the survey communities in both IFLS waves. 
A related potential estimation problem could arise from the fact that 
victimization may be selective and correlated with activity participation, in particular 
because being involved in some community activities may make individuals more 
visible. Moreover, individuals having experienced violence may have migrated out in 
large proportions. These issues are controlled for by examining various subsamples of 
individuals more or less likely to suffer from such selection. We find our results robust 
to these checks. 
Endogeneity and selection bias issues may generally be seen as originated from 
missing variables. These issues are attenuated in our study by several elements. First, 
we introduce province, time and individual effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity of individuals and situations that may cause endogeneity or selection bias. 
Second, we incorporate a very large set of correlates (56) in the regressions, likely to 
yield greater control than normal. Third, as mentioned above, we lag the variables most 
likely to have endogeneity issues in a context of non-stationary violence patterns. 
Fourth, a series of alternative sub-samples and conflict coefficients are employed to test 
the robustness of our findings. Fifth, since the conflict data come from another and more 
aggregated source than the household survey, there is little likelihood of endogenous 
conflict variables specifically at household level.  
Sixth, we check that there are no problems at the aggregate village level with 
respect to these issues. For example, we find the aggregate correlation between violence 
                                                 
5
  For example, the IFLS interview conducted in December 2000 implies using a conflict indicator that 
covers incidents of violence during the January 1998 - December 1999 period. The UNSFIR data on 
communal violence is only available until 2003, which precludes the use of the 2007 IFLS wave. 
Introducing long lags would result in missing out the period of most intense violence in 1997-2000.  
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and out-migrations to be small and insignificant. The share of IFLS2 respondents that 
out-migrated between 1998 and IFLS3 is 11.52 % on average in districts with no 
violence and 11.51 % in districts with high intensity of violence. Similarly, the sample 
attrition appears not to be correlated with violence at district level. The proportion of 
individuals observed in IFLS2 and no longer observed in ILFS3 is 11.55 % in districts 
with no violence and 12.22 % in districts with high intensity of violence, with the 
difference being non-significant. Besides, restricting the sample to permanent 
respondents yields similar estimates as what is reported in the next section.  
Finally, we introduce instrumental variables to test the robustness of our results 
and to verify that the above measures sufficiently account for potential endogeneity in 
the model. For this, we rely on indicators of conflict intensity in neighbouring districts, 
which are assumed to (i) be related to local levels of conflict through spatial spill-over 
effects; and (ii) have no impact on citizen‟s participation in „domestic‟ community 
groups. The assumptions are supported by the large geographical size of districts that 
suggests that news about faraway violence should not significantly affect participation 
in local groups. We now turn to our empirical results. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 describes the prevalence of each activity at village level and the 
distribution of individual participation across the sample. Information on the prevalence 
of these activities is gathered from two levels: an interview with the village head from 
the IFLS Community-Facility Survey on the one hand, and the reports on activity 
prevalence and individual participation from the individual respondents on the other.
6
 
The resulting figures confirm an almost universal prevalence of all types of activities 
during both survey years. The one exception is the cooperatives, which are present in 71 
per cent (1997) and 79 per cent (2000) of the villages, respectively. 
Conditional on individual knowledge of existing activities, we observe 
significant differences in participation rates across activity categories and over time.
7
 In 
1997, local governance events and social services are frequented by around 50 per cent 
                                                 
6
  Additionally, the interview with the head of the women‟s group provides information on the existence 
of cooperatives. We therefore assume the prevalence of an activity when either the village head states 
the existence or when at least one surveyed village member reports participation. 
7 
 Muller and Vothknecht (2010) thoroughly investigate the joint determinants of knowledge and 
participation in basic activities in Indonesia, and the relationship of knowledge and participation. 
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of those individuals aware of their existence. Participation in activities related to 
infrastructural development and neighbourhood security groups is substantially higher, 
while comparably low participation rates are reported for cooperatives. We observe a 
substantial decline in citizen participation between 1997 and 2000. Across categories, 
people appear less willing to engage in common activities during the early phase of the 
country‟s transition. We include a time dummy in the regression analysis to distinguish 
this general trend in the post New Order period, in particular from the effect of violent 
conflict. 
Figure 1 shows the total number of conflict-related fatalities in our sample for 
the 1990-2003 period. We can see an increase in conflict deaths in 1997, coinciding 
with the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis. The number of fatalities peaks in the first 
years after President Suharto‟s fall, before the level of violence tends to decrease again 
from 2001 onwards. Fatal violence is thereby highly locally concentrated: out of the 96 
districts in the sample, only 11 districts report ten or more deaths from group violence in 
the years 1998 and 1999, while more than 50 per cent had no fatalities at all. As a matter 
of fact, we observe an average of only 1.3 fatalities per district once the 1998 May riots 
in Jakarta are excluded (Table 3).  
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of violence across the regions included in the 
analysis for the 1998-1999 period. Aside from the capital city, violence was 
predominantly observed in the western and central parts of Java, while large parts of 
East Java remained relatively peaceful. The islands of West Nusa Tenggara uniformly 
show low conflict intensities; ten fatalities are reported from the northern districts of 
South Sulawesi, Luwu und North Luwu. Finally, Table 4 reports descriptive statistics 
for the variables used in the regression analysis that we now discuss. 
 
 
4.2. Base Random Effect Logit Regression Results 
We run separate random-effect logit regressions on individual participation for 
each constructed activity category.
8
 Our base regression results are presented in Table 5. 
Many variants of these estimates have been tried, e.g. with adopting different error 
                                                 
8 
 Beard (2005, 2007) estimates ordinary logit models of citizen participation in Indonesia with a much 
reduced set of correlates as compared to ours. In particular, there is no violence variable in her 
specification. Also, as she does not avail of panel data, her estimates do not control for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity, a crucial component of individual decisions. Finally, our nomenclature of 
activities differs. However, we find similar qualitative signs of coefficients for general participation in 
the case of several demographic and education variables, which is reassuring. 
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shapes and correlation hypotheses, or OLS linear regressions. Indeed, as Manski (1997) 
showed, inference in such dichotomous-variable models remains possible with general 
specifications as long as errors are time-stationary with unbounded support and some 
explanatory variables vary over time. However, Chamberlain (2010) demonstrated that 
if the support for the observed predictors is bounded, then identification (as long as 
efficient and fast-converging estimation) is possible only in the logistic case when there 
is unrestricted distribution of random effects. This leads us to favour the report of the 
random-effect logit estimates. Nonetheless, the qualitative estimated effects are robust 
to the above changes of specification. The estimated marginal effects for the individual, 
household, and village level control variables are in line with expectations and previous 
findings from the literature, even though our specification is much richer than what is 
found elsewhere.  
The proportion of the total variance of errors that can be attributed to unobserved 
individual heterogeneity through individual random effects is substantial. It ranges from 
23 % to 60 % depending on the considered activity, with the exception of infrastructure 
groups. This suggests that many of the decision determinants originate in unobserved 
individual characteristics that are stable over time. Incorporating individual random 
effects is also important as it allows us to control for relevant unobserved village or 
district characteristics that do not vary or that vary little over time. This is the case for 
local unemployment rates, local religious composition, local population density, and so 
forth. 
We observe strong effects for age, gender and the individual‟s position within 
the household, which point to societal role models that encourage or discourage 
participation in village life. On the one hand, participation in most activities further 
requires a minimum level of skills. On the other hand, involvement is increasing with 
educational attainment (although with higher education individuals seem to drop out 
from security groups).  
Citizen participation is obviously driven by specific individual needs related to 
occupation, family characteristics or special situations, which can all be addressed 
through different community activities. Recent migrants, as well as members of ethnic 
minorities,
9
 are less likely to participate, especially in governance and risk-sharing 
                                                 
9
  Information on individual ethnicity is obtained from IFLS4 (collected in 2007/2008); the share of the 
three main ethnicities in each village/neighborhood is extracted from the IFLS2 community survey. As 
no information on ethnicity is available from IFLS3, we assume stable ethnic composition of villages 
between 1997 and 2000.  
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activities, perhaps because of different needs or weaker network access. The 
economically better off are the most likely to be involved in local decision-making, 
while being less present when it comes to the improvement of local infrastructure. 
Finally, we find relatively few village-level effects, which are partly absorbed by the 
highly significant province dummies and individual random effects.  
 
4.3. The Impact of Violence 
In the base specification, we include two dummy variables to control for the 
impact of prevalent violence on citizen engagement: districts with fewer than 10 
reported fatalities form the group of “low intensity conflict” districts, while districts 
with ten or more fatalities are categorized as “high intensity conflict” areas. We tried 
other dichotomies of districts by violence severity, but they did not improve inferences. 
Such separation is potentially important as there may be thresholds under which 
violence does not affect most activities, for example if isolated incidents are not 
interpreted as a signal of a local violent context. Using the number of fatalities (and the 
number of incidents as a continuous variable) yields less significant results. Besides, we 
cannot normalize fatalities by the district size or the distance since these data are not 
available. We thus stick to our two discrete variables describing the number of fatalities. 
On the whole, the estimated conflict coefficients show substantially lower 
individual involvement in those districts affected by violence. This significant negative 
effect of conflict on civic engagement, increasingly intensive with conflict level, is 
found across activity categories, with the exception of participation in cooperatives in 
high intensity conflict areas, in which case the effect is insignificant.  
 
4.4. The Role of Ethnic Polarization 
In the next step, we turn to potentially distinct impacts of violence on 
community participation in ethnically diverse areas. This is important because much of 
the violence in Indonesia is commonly associated with tensions across ethnic groups. In 
this case, local tensions might hamper cooperation both among and across ethnic 
groups. For this purpose, the measure of ethnic polarization, PQ, proposed by Reynal-
Querol (2002) is calculated for each community, j:  
PQj = 4  si
2n
i=1  1 − si ,  (3) 
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where si is the relative size of the i-th largest ethnic group and n is the number of 
ethnic groups in community j.
10
 Ranging between 0 and 1, a higher value of the PQ 
index indicates a more ethnically polarized community, with PQ equal to 0 for an 
ethnically homogeneous community and PQ equal to 1 for a community with two ethnic 
groups of the same size. When this measure is included in the regression framework, 
Table 5 shows an overall positive relationship between ethnic polarization and citizen 
engagement across all types of local groups, except for security groups. Cooperatives, in 
particular, are more frequented in highly polarized communities. Interestingly, dummies 
for specific ethnic groups, or a dummy whether the respondent belongs to the ethnic 
minority in the village, are not significant. Thus, polarization seems to be the relevant 
concept for capturing ethnic interaction in that case. 
In order to assess the role of ethnic polarization for community participation in 
conflict-affected areas, we interact the conflict indices with a dummy variable for high 
ethnic polarization.
11
 Table 6 presents the results for the polarization and conflict 
variables only. As the inclusion of interaction terms in non-linear regression models 
leads to biased estimates of marginal effects (Norton et al., 2004), we report the 
unbiased coefficient estimates here instead. When adding the interaction terms to the 
base regression setup, the negative impact of communal violence on citizen 
participation is partly offset in those conflict-affected communities with a high degree 
of ethnic polarization. In contrast to the previously found decrease in participation in 
local governance organizations and social services in conflict regions, participation is 
found to be hardly affected in villages characterized by a high degree of ethnic 
polarization. On the whole, the negative effect of conflict on community participation 
turns out to be significantly stronger in ethnically homogeneous areas.  
The robustness of these findings is supported by a series of alternative 
specifications. Table A1 in the Appendix presents the estimated marginal effects of the 
conflict variables for different sub-samples and conflict definitions. Since the main 
trends hold when the capital city of Jakarta is excluded and when the sample is 
restricted to the Javanese provinces (Table A1, Panel I and II), the findings are not 
                                                 
10
 The calculation of some village characteristics, e.g., ethnic polarization, is based on the survey sub-
samples in each village. Although these sub-samples were drawn randomly, and are therefore 
representative, they involve some small sampling variations which are not accounted for in the 
estimation. However, since we have 197 such villages and on average about 60 interviewed individuals in 
most villages, we expect these random variations to be smoothed out and not to affect the analysis 
substantially. 
11
  The high polarization dummy equals 1 if PQ > 0.5, which is the case for 28.5 per cent of the villages in 
our sample.  
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entirely driven by a single conflict region. Results are also confirmed for a five fatalities 
threshold from low to high intensity violence and for a continuous indicator of the 
number of fatalities and its squared term (Table A1, Panel III and IV). Further, we 
repeat the analysis for the whole sample, i.e. including individuals without knowledge 
of activity existence (Table A1, Panel V). The results are similar to the estimates from 
the main regressions and mitigate concerns of sample selection biases. The use of the 
Herfindahl index of ethnic fragmentation
12
 as an alternative way of capturing ethnic 
diversity results in estimates similar to those obtained with the PQ measure (Table A1, 
Panel VI). Finally, media reports put some emphasis on the victimization of Chinese 
households during violence. The Chinese community may be more visible and 
vulnerable because of its presence in trade activities throughout the country. However, 
close examination of the data clearly shows that Chinese households cannot drive the 
bulk of our results related to the role of ethnicity. The group of ethnic Chinese only 
represent 0.7 per cent of the respondents in the sample, and an additional dummy for 
ethnic Chinese is insignificant in all specifications.
13
 
As the marginal effects estimates of interaction terms in non-linear models are 
biased, we instead investigate the magnitude of the observed effects of violence by 
referring to participation probabilities. Based on the fitted regression values, the 
probabilities of participation are calculated for each individual and category of interest. 
We then compare the average estimated probabilities in conflict-affected regions to a 
counterfactual of “no violence” case.14 Table 7 reports the estimates, disaggregated by 
low and high conflict intensity and by the degree of ethnic polarization. When ethnic 
polarization is low (Panel I), average participation is substantially lower in the face of 
group violence: the participation propensity is up to 15 percentage points lower in high 
intensity conflict areas than in counterfactual “no violence” areas. This effect is 
strongest for social services, security groups, and governance activities, whereas 
cooperatives seem to be hardly affected by violence. In areas with low levels of ethnic 
polarization and low conflict intensity, a generally lower, while still significant decline 
in participation is observed.  
                                                 
12
  The index is constructed as  EHHI = 1 −  si
2n
i=1 , where si is the size of the i-th largest ethnic group in 
the community. It is the probability that two randomly drawn individuals belong to different groups. 
13 
 Another possibility is that violence against Chinese is under-reported in newspapers. However, 
Panggabean and Smith (2009) also show that anti-Chinese violence was rare and more localized than 
often thought.  
14
  We use the estimated regression model and impose a counterfactual level zero of violence for all 
districts to calculate counterfactual participation propensities. 
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A different picture, however, emerges in areas with a high degree of ethnic 
polarization (Panel II). Irrespective of conflict intensity, average participation 
probabilities in polarized communities decrease comparably little in the presence of 
violence. In particular, participation in community meetings appears to be barely 
affected; the estimates even point to increasing involvement in cooperatives in those 
districts most affected by violence. While communal violence negatively affects citizen 
engagement at the local level, the presence of ethnic polarization also seems to spark 
participation in community groups, especially after conflict.  
 
4.5. Bonding versus Bridging Social Capital 
When such an increased engagement in the local community runs along ethnic 
lines, social networks organized within ethnic groups may be strengthened and existing 
gaps between ethnic groups may be widened. To address this dark side of social capital 
in violent environments, we investigate the ethnic composition of communal groups in 
greater detail. Namely, an indicator is calculated for each activity that measures the 
engagement of members of one‟s own ethnic group relative to the engagement of other 
ethnic groups in the community. In the absence of full information on the membership 
of local groups, this indicator allows us to capture the relative presence of an ethnic 
group in each village and each activity.
15
 We include this indicator of the ethnic 
structure of local groups as an additional control variable, and we further interact this 
indicator with the conflict and high polarization variables. 
Table 8 presents the estimated coefficients for the included ethnicity and conflict 
variables. We find similar effects for those variables and cross-effects already included 
in the previous regression setup (Table 6), which are therefore confirmed. New here is 
the relative participation of the own ethnic group in the respective activities, which has 
an overall positive effect on participation in governance groups, cooperatives, and, less 
so, in social service groups. There is no influence of this newly introduced regressor on 
participation in infrastructure groups. Moreover, the sheer size of the own ethnic group, 
measured as a fraction of the total local population, positively influences community 
participation in governance, risk sharing and social service activities.  
                                                 
15
  For the indicator, we substract the share of participating respondents in other ethnic groups from the 
share of participants in the respondent‟s own ethnic group. Ranging between -1 and 1, a higher value 
indicates larger relative involvement of the own ethnic group (the indicator equals 1 if all members of 
the own ethnicity and no member of other ethnic groups report participation, and -1 vice versa). To 
avoid concerns of endogeneity, we exclude the respondent‟s own observation from the calculation of 
participation shares. 
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When focusing on conflict areas with a high degree of ethnic polarization, we 
find that citizen participation in governance activities and social services increases 
substantially with the relative share of participants from the own ethnicity, and 
especially so in areas with a high conflict intensity. Put differently, the willingness to 
become involved in certain local groups decreases with the relative engagement of 
people from other ethnic groups. This finding holds not only for highly polarized 
regions, but is also found for governance activities in high conflict intensity regions 
with lower levels of ethnic polarization (Table A2). 
The magnitude of this effect is substantial. Table 9 presents average 
participation probabilities in highly polarized, high conflict intensity areas, by the 
relative participation share of the respondent‟s ethnic group. Focusing on local 
governance and social services, results indicate a decrease in participation by around 
one third in the presence of violence whenever members of other ethnic groups are 
relatively more involved in these groups. On the contrary, the likelihood of participation 
increases when activities are relatively strongly frequented by members of the own 
ethnicity. Similar patterns are observed for infrastructure development activities, while 
participation in cooperatives seems to increase in times of conflict irrespective of the 
relative involvement of local ethnic groups.  
The presence of severe violence hence seems to strengthen bonding networks 
and to sharpen local divisions along ethnic lines. This result is consistent with Alesina 
and La Ferrara‟s (2000) findings for the United States. One possible explanation is that 
some community meetings and activities are directly motivated by responding to 
conflict situations. They may help preparing bargaining between groups, contribute to 
organise fighting and security measures against other groups, or even be held due to 
protection and insurance motives within specific groups. In these areas of tense 
opposition between groups, large participation changes can be fostered by violence, 
ranging from much reduced participation to participation instigation, especially for 
social services and cooperative activities.  
 
4.6. Other Individual Determinants of Participation in Conflict Areas 
Finally, we turn to individual characteristics other than ethnicity that might 
affect engagement in one‟s community in the presence of violence. As before, we 
interact the conflict variables with socio-economic variables of interest, namely 
individual education, age, and household wealth. Table 10 presents the most relevant 
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results. While no specific conflict effects for individuals without primary education are 
found (results not shown), respondents with at least secondary education show a higher 
propensity to join local cooperatives in high intensity conflict areas (Table 10, Panel I). 
The well-educated individuals may be better able to use this form of mutual insurance, 
if only because they are able to perform basic financial calculations, in order to protect 
themselves against the vagaries inherent to violent conflict. They may also be led to 
accept executive positions in these groups, which may shield members from the 
negative consequences of conflict.  
Panel II and III of Table 10 illustrate the different effects of violent conflict on 
community participation of poor and wealthy households, respectively. Poor 
households, as defined by the first quartile of asset levels, tend to withdraw from 
infrastructure development projects, which they may perceive as a minor priority in 
times of violence. However, comparably higher participation of the poor is observed for 
social services, which most likely supply them with needed assistance in these 
situations. On the other hand, the well-off, in the fourth quartile of assets may seek for 
protection of their capital or economic activities through participation in cooperatives 
and infrastructure groups. They may also be invited to accept responsibilities within 
these organizations to help the community to respond to the violent context. Finally, 
their drop out from neighbourhood security organizations might be explained by 
increasing risks related to engagement and a greater ability to employ private measures 
of protection.  
In a final effort, we attempt to assess the internal homogeneity of different 
community groups in terms of member characteristics. Therefore, we calculate the mean 
age, educational attainment, and household equivalent consumption of group members 
for each activity and community,
16
 from which we derive the absolute distance from 
these group means for each respondent. Table A3 in the Appendix reports the mean age, 
mean household equivalent consumption and mean educational attainment by type of 
activity, as well as the average deviation from these group means by participants and 
non-participants. The group means reveal that the members of cooperatives and 
community meetings are relatively old, well-educated and wealthy, while the opposite is 
true for participants in the social service activities. 
                                                 
16  We only calculate the mean values for those groups for which we observe at least three group 
members. 
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The descriptive statistics further show that participants within each activity type 
are relatively homogenous in terms of age, consumption level and education. Across 
activities, respondents who report participation are on average significantly closer to the 
respective group means than non-participants. When we include these indicators into the 
main regression setup (results not shown), we find highly significant and substantial 
negative effects of the individual distance from the group mean on the likelihood of 
participation. Community groups are hence mainly frequented by citizens with similar 
socio-economic characteristics, while individuals of deviant age, educational 
background or wealth tend to stay away from community engagement. Interestingly, 
apart from the ethnic dimensions, we do not find a particularly strong effect of such a 
gathering of equals in conflict-affected regions.  
Clearly, the estimated effects of context characteristics, ethnic group, education, 
wealth variables – interacted or not with conflict indicators – may allow for diverse 
interpretations, even though we have sometimes proposed some preferred interpretation 
lines. An interpretation we have not mentioned yet is that of group capture of some 
activities. These groups could be ethnic communities specialized in specific activities 
linked to their economic or political background. Certain social classes may also be 
better positioned to access some of these social benefits, for example on network, 
localization or information grounds.  
 
4.7. Robustness of the Results 
While we control for a large number of factors likely to drive citizen 
participation, we cannot fully rule out the existence of unobserved community 
characteristics that simultaneously cause low participation levels and violent tensions, 
even with lagged variables. We therefore instrument for conflict using the average 
conflict intensity in the neighboring districts
17
 in order to check the robustness of our 
results. Indeed, violence in neighboring districts is not likely to affect substantially 
activity participation in the district of interest because districts are large geographical 
units, once district-specific violence is accounted for. Moreover, violence phenomena 
are also likely to be correlated between neighboring districts, since there is no reason 
why they should stop at the district borders. 
                                                 
17  Specifically, we calculate the share of neighboring districts with (i) 1-9 conflict-related fatalities, and 
(ii) 10 or more conflict-related fatalities, and use these variables to instrument for the respective 
„domestic‟ conflict indicators. As data on conflict-related fatalities in neighboring districts is not 
always available, we lose some 20 percent of the observations. However, previous results also hold 
with the reduced sample used for the IV estimations. 
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As the correction for endogenous interaction terms is problematic in binary 
panel models, we rely on least-square estimation for a more straightforward 
implementation of IV estimates. We therefore, first, run linear RE regressions on 
individual participation in the various activities, (i) for comparison with the RE logit 
results, and (ii) as a baseline for the IV estimates. Similar to Table 6, Table 11 presents 
the coefficient estimates for the conflict and ethnicity variables. While not efficient, the 
estimates are consistent and, more importantly, qualitatively turn out very similar to the 
RE logit results.  
In a second step, we instrument for the conflict intensity dummies and the 
conflict*high ethnic polarization interaction terms using (i) the average conflict 
intensity in neighboring districts; (ii) the interaction of neighboring conflict intensity 
and high domestic levels of ethnic polarization; and (iii) the squared terms of these 
instruments. Table 12 reports the estimated coefficients for the variables of interest. The 
main findings hold strongly: we find lower participation levels in areas affected by 
violent conflict, while this effect is more than offset in areas with a high degree of 
ethnic polarization.  
Similarly, the results on the role of the relative presence of the own ethnic group 
for citizen participation are confirmed (i) when running linear RE regressions (Table 
13); and (ii) when instrumenting for conflict with average conflict intensity in 
neighboring districts (Table 14). In conflict-affected districts, citizens are significantly 
more likely to get engaged in activities with a strong presence of the own ethnic group, 
in particular when it comes to local governance, social services, and infrastructure 
development.  
Further, we assess the magnitude of the potential endogeneity of the conflict 
indicators by running Hausman tests comparing the linear RE and the IV estimates. As 
expected form the close proximity of RE and IV RE estimates of coefficients, and from 
the large sample size, the null hypothesis of systematic equality between the estimated 
coefficients is clearly never rejected throughout (P-values of 0.97 for governance, and 
almost 1 for the other activities), therefore supporting the consistency of our results 
without any need to use instruments
18
. 
                                                 
18
 Finally, we have also employed an alternative source of data on violence: The 
PODES village survey, which is collected three times per decade and since 2003 
includes a section on conflict and violence. With these data, we can use the 2007 IFLS 
wave and include an indicator of conflict fatalities at district level. Two thirds of the 
districts report no conflict-related fatality, and in the remaining third of the districts we 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper analyses how citizen participation in local community activities is 
affected by low intensity forms of violent conflict. Using micro-level and conflict event 
data from the Indonesian transition at the turn of the millennium, we find that citizen 
participation generally decreases substantially in areas affected by group violence 
during this period. This is true for different types of local groups, ranging from local 
governance to social services, and risk-sharing activities.  
However, in communities with a high degree of ethnic polarization, local 
involvement in community activities is far less impacted by conflict than in ethnically 
homogeneous environments. Participation in risk-sharing activities is even rising, 
perhaps as a response to violence. Individual engagement in community groups is 
particularly stimulated by the relative presence of one‟s own ethnic group and 
discouraged with participation of people from other ethnic groups. Social divisions are 
hence likely to worsen in times of violence. Beyond ethnic identity, the better-off and 
the well-educated are found to get further involved in local risk-sharing initiatives in 
times of severe conflict, while dropping out of other common groups. Local social 
networks therefore appear to be either threatened or stimulated by the presence of 
violent conflict, with a greater risk of exclusion for ethnic, social or economic 
minorities.  
Moreover, our results go beyond identifying key determinants of local 
community activities in Indonesia. They also elicit general insights into how to think 
about community participation, in particular in the context of violent conflict. Notably, 
they show the danger of generalization when dealing with local activities. We find a 
wide variety of responses depending on the type of activity considered and its expected 
economic or social function. This also raises the need for better and more accurate 
definitions of „violence effects‟ in the literature, starting with the type of violence and 
the type of the local initiative. Moreover, we find evidence for interrelations between 
                                                                                                                                               
never observe more than five fatalities, which suggests that the PODES conflict data is 
somewhat inferior to the one we use. However, we ran RE Logit regressions for the 
three-wave sample. Overall, results (not shown to save space) are similar to the previous 
results using only IFLS2 and ISFL3. This notably applies to the estimates of the conflict 
coefficients. Some effects vanish, while the results turn out to be stronger for 
governance and social services.  
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the social structure of society and violence, in particular in dimensions of ethnicity, 
education and wealth. Therefore, beyond studying general „violence effects,‟ the social 
mechanisms through which violence operates and through which people respond to 
violence should be investigated more closely. 
Finally, we find large individual heterogeneity in the effect of violent conflict on 
activity participation, with both observed and unobserved components of this 
heterogeneity being substantial in our estimates. This suggests paying greater attention 
to the distribution of conflict impacts as to account for heterogeneity, which is often 
neglected in the analysis of global effects. 
In particular, in our data, different ethnic groups and different social classes are 
found to suffer and to respond differently to conflict situations. This occurrence of 
ethnic influences raises additional questions, as in Kanbur et al. (2011). In the long 
term, ethnicity is the product of a certain kind of group dynamics. If violence 
strengthens group divisions, it may instigate the tightening of social groups. In this 
view, participation in community activities may be a preliminary stage in the emergence 
of future groups, illustrating the complex interactions of economic and ethnic 
solidarities in society.
19
 An extreme, while plausible, interaction case is the capture of 
an activity by one ethnic group, or by a minority of community members. 
What has been learned about the functioning of community activities by looking 
at how violent conflict affects them? First and foremost, we found that local community 
activities are not immune to violence and cannot constitute, by themselves, a sufficient 
safety net when market and state institutions are disrupted by conflict. We have also 
learned that there are broad classes of activities that seem to differ in their social and 
economic responses to a given type of risk, and perhaps to all risks. Establishing a 
reasoned nomenclature of these activities is clearly a task necessary for avoiding 
confusing generalizations, and we made a step in this direction.  
Another valuable finding is that observed and unobserved heterogeneities are 
crucial in understanding citizen participation in community activities, and that 
controlling for heterogeneity reveals diverse and original effects, dependent also on the 
type of activities. Thus, once these analytical tasks are performed, it can be revealed, as 
we do for Indonesia, that participation in some activities is stimulated by conflict 
                                                 
19 
 Dasgupta and Kanbur (2007) investigate theoretically how community and class divisions may 
interrelate. 
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situations, perhaps because they are part of the response mechanisms of various ethnic 
and social groups to these shocks. 
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Table 1: Overview of Community Organizations 
CATEGORY Activity 
(Indonesian Term) 
Background Information 
LOCAL 
GOVERNANCE 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Community Meeting  
Including Village Advisory 
Board activities 
Pertemuan Masyarakat 
Community meetings are organized at various levels. The RT 
(Rukun Tetangga, neighbourhood) is the lowest tier of governmental 
hierarchy and comprises about 20-50 households. The 
neighbourhood association is supposed to manage various 
community matters, and usually also organizes the neighbourhood 
watches. 
 
Women’s association 
activities 
Kegiatan PKK 
The Women‟s Family Welfare Organization (PKK) was first 
promoted in 1972 as a national organization. The PKK is organized 
at all administrative tiers, from the neighbourhood to the national 
level, and mainly organizes health and education services.  
SOCIAL SERVICES 
(Females Only) 
 
 
Community Weighing Post 
Posyandu 
The integrated community health post (Posyandu) is run by 
volunteers and provides preventative health care for young children. 
There are over 200,000 Posyandu spread out in urban and rural 
areas, in general supported by sub-district health centers and their 
trained staff.  
Voluntary Labor  
(Jumat Bersih) 
Jumat Bersih (“Clean Friday Movement”) is intended to promote 
healthy living behaviour with emphasis on personal, domestic and 
community hygiene starting on Thursday evenings.  
INFRASTRUCTURE 
DEVELOPMENT 
INITIATIVES 
(Males Only) 
Program to Improve the 
Village/Neighborhood 
Street improvement, public 
facilities 
Program Perbaikan Kampung  
(KIP, MHT, Konblokisasi) 
The Kampung Improvement Program (KIP) mainly addresses the 
housing problems of low- and middle-income households. Typical 
activities include the building or renovation of school and health 
facilities, the improvement of the living space (lighting, footpaths), 
or the reduction of housing density. MHT is a part of the nation-
wide KIP program. 
System for Drinking Water 
Sistem mengelola air untuk 
minum 
Activities aimed at the improvement of the neighbourhood 
infrastructure, such as the installation of a public pump system or 
the construction of public washing areas (MCK, referring to bath, 
wash, toilet).  
System for Garbage 
Disposal 
Sistem mengelola sampah 
padat  
Set-up and maintenance of a system for garbage disposal.  
MUTUAL INSURANCE 
Neighborhood Security 
Organisation 
Ronda/Siskamling 
Ronda, neighbourhood watches, have a long tradition especially on 
Java. This non-paid community service is provided by volunteers 
and typically organized at the neighbourhood or street level. 
Siskamling describes private security units whose guards might 
receive a small salary and also protect public or business facilities. 
Cooperatives 
Includes all types and levels of 
cooperatives 
Kooperasi 
Cooperatives encompass a wide range of potential organizations. In 
general, a cooperative is intended to pool resources and to share 
risks among a group of actors with similar economic or socials 
needs. This might include retailers‟ cooperatives, credit unions, or 
agricultural cooperatives. 
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Table 2: Prevalence of Activities and Individual Participation Rates 
Category 
Prevalence of Activities (%) Individual Participation 
1997 2000 
1997 2000 
Obs. * Share PA** Obs. Share PA 
Local Governance 99.5 100.0 5,675 48.2 7,607 30.2 
Social Services*** 100.0 100.0 4,257 52.3 5,244 34.7 
Infrastructure Development**** 96.5 96.5 1,795 77.8 1,979 59.6 
Neighborhood Security Groups**** 98.5 96.5 2,012 73.5 1,197 54.8 
Cooperatives 70.5 79.4 1,066 23.1 2,412 13.6 
*  Conditional on the Individual Knowledge of the Existence of Activities.  
**  Participation (PA) equals “1” if engaged in at least one of the activities in a category. Participation is “0” when the 
respondent is not participating, but aware of at least one of the activities in a given category.  
*** Females only. **** Males only. 
 
 
Table 3: Conflict Indicators – Summary Statistics 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Whole Sample 
Violence at District level: Number of Fatalities 192 7.8 39.7 0 263 
Violence at District level: No fatalities (Dummy) 192 0.625 0.485 0 1 
Violence at District level: ≥ 5 fatalities (Dummy) 192 0.089 0.285 0 1 
Violence at District level: ≥ 10 fatalities (Dummy) 192 0.057 0.233 0 1 
 Whole Sample – Jakarta Excluded 
Violence at District level: Number of Fatalities 182 1.3 4.3 0 40 
Violence at District level: No fatalities (Dummy) 182 0.648 0.479 0 1 
Violence at District level: ≥ 5 fatalities (Dummy) 182 0.060 0.239 0 1 
Violence at District level: ≥ 10 fatalities (Dummy) 182 0.033 0.179 0 1 
 Java Only 
Violence at District level: Number of Fatalities 154 9.5 44.2 0 263 
Violence at District level: No fatalities (Dummy) 154 0.617 0.488 0 1 
Violence at District level: ≥ 5 fatalities (Dummy) 154 0.097 0.297 0 1 
Violence at District level: ≥ 10 fatalities (Dummy) 154 0.071 0.258 0 1 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Individual Characteristics 
Age 24974 37.5 16.7 14 111 
Sex (1: Male) 24974 0.462 0.499 0 1 
No education 24974 0.154 0.361 0 1 
Primary education 24974 0.444 0.497 0 1 
Junior high school 24974 0.153 0.360 0 1 
Senior high school 24974 0.195 0.396 0 1 
Higher education 24974 0.054 0.227 0 1 
Employment: private worker 24972 0.253 0.434 0 1 
Employment: self-employed 24972 0.265 0.441 0 1 
Employment: unpaid family worker 24972 0.083 0.276 0 1 
Employment: government worker 24972 0.039 0.195 0 1 
Hours normally worked per week 24974 28.2 27.9 0 112 
Monthly income (in 1,000 Rp.,a 2000 Prices) 24973 235.3 717.6 0 30,000 
Married 24974 0.643 0.479 0 1 
Household head or spouse 24974 0.602 0.489 0 1 
Dummy: Seriousness of the respondent not excellent or goodb 24974 0.223 0.416 0 1 
 Household Characteristics 
Age household head 9002 47.6 14.5 15 111 
Household consumption (adult equivalent, in 1,000 Rp., 2000 Prices) 8507 215.4 282.2 3.5 6,526.3 
Household asset value, relative rank in the community 9002 0.522 0.289 0.022 1 
Household with farm production 9002 0.349 0.477 0 1 
Household with Income from Non-farm Business 9002 0.349 0.494 0 1 
Female headed household 9002 0.179 0.381 0 1 
Number of household adults 9002 4.0 2.0 1 20 
Experience of a shock (natural disaster) 9002 0.281 0.449 0 1 
Household has moved to this community in the last 2 years 9002 0.014 0.117 0 1 
Household owns a television 9002 0.539 0.499 0 1 
 Community Characteristics & Province Dummies 
Rural 394 0.389 0.487 0 1 
Total population 394 12,867 19,587 825 236,500 
Average HH asset value in the village (in Mio. Rp.) 394 71.4 102.3 5.7 1,079.18 
Within-village Gini index of asset inequality 394 0.530 0.123 0.171 0.885 
Index of ethnic polarization 378 0.354 0.361 0 0.99 
Index of ethnic fractionalization 378 0.222 0.240 0 0.82 
Province dummy: Jakarta 394 0.175 0.381 0 1 
Province dummy: Jawa Barat 394 0.259 0.439 0 1 
Province dummy: Jawa Tengah 394 0.183 0.387 0 1 
Province dummy: Jawa Timur 394 0.226 0.419 0 1 
Province dummy: Nusa Tenggara Barat 394 0.081 0.274 0 1 
Province dummy: Sulawesi Selatan 394 0.076 0.266 0 1 
a  Exchange rate in 2000: 1 US-$ ~ 3,000 IDR  
b  As assessed by the interviewer.  
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Table 5: Base Random Effect Logit Regression Results 
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
 
Individual Characteristics 
Age Group: 25-39 Yearsa 
0.114*** 0.063*** 0.059** 0.180*** 0.065*** 
(0.000) (0.009) (0.047) (0.000) (0.002) *** 
Age Group: 40-65 Years 
0.155*** -0.068** 0.095* 0.150*** 0.122 
(0.000) (0.021) (0.052) (0.006) (0.001) 
Age Group: >65 Years 
0.119** -0.107** 0.080 -0.101 0.175 
(0.042) (0.034) (0.209) (0.353) (0.175) 
Male 
0.354***    -0.010 
(0.000)    (0.138) 
No educationb 
-0.145*** -0.147*** -0.038 -0.119** -0.021*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.361) (0.018) (0.006) 
Junior High School 
0.066*** 0.057** -0.040 -0.068** 0.014 
(0.001) (0.021) (0.125) (0.049) (0.187) 
Senior High School  
0.101*** 0.057** -0.026 -0.078** 0.038*** 
(0.000) (0.030) (0.333) (0.025) (0.009) 
Higher Education 
0.111*** 0.012 -0.004 -0.039 0.063** 
(0.003) (0.806) (0.923) (0.508) (0.049) 
Job Category: Private Workerc 
0.033 0.028 0.140*** 0.177*** 0.034 
(0.302) (0.504) (0.001) (0.000) (0.114) 
Job Category: Self-Employed 
0.064** 0.083** 0.149*** 0.138*** 0.022 
(0.038) (0.043) (0.000) (0.006) (0.231) 
Job Category: Unpaid Family 
Worker 
0.009 0.011 0.125*** 0.006 -0.002 
(0.731) (0.703) (0.000) (0.912) (0.863) 
Job Category: Government  
0.164*** 0.198*** 0.161*** 0.179*** 0.189** 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) 
Hours worked per week 
-0.001 -0.016*** -0.006 0.007 0.000 
(0.697) (0.000) (0.182) (0.254) (0.967) 
Total monthly income (ln) 
0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.005 -0.001 
(0.464) (0.151) (0.474) (0.152) (0.398) 
Married 
0.147*** 0.382*** 0.047 0.100** 0.009 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.187) (0.018) (0.313) 
Head or Spouse of Head 
0.138*** 0.022 0.022 0.118** 0.023** 
(0.000) (0.409) (0.643) (0.042) (0.045) 
Population Share of one‟s own 
Ethnicity in the Village 
0.129*** 0.100** 0.075 0.097* 0.027 
(0.001) (0.028) (0.109) (0.097) (0.135) 
Seriousness of Answers:  
not excellent or good 
-0.009 -0.032* -0.051** 0.009 0.006 
(0.542) (0.065) (0.025) (0.738) (0.418) 
 
Household Characteristics 
Age HH Head: 40-65 Yearsa 
0.022 -0.112*** -0.061 0.009 -0.012 
(0.257) (0.000) (0.116) (0.846) (0.273) 
Age HH Head: >65 Years 
0.014 -0.143*** -0.069 0.006 -0.021 
(0.643) (0.000) (0.245) (0.916) (0.023) ** 
Household Expenditure –  
1st  Quantiled 
-0.051*** -0.010 -0.001 -0.023 -0.005 
(0.000) (0.554) (0.979) (0.397) (0.493) 
Household Expenditure –  
4th Quantile 
0.079*** 0.001 -0.050** 0.013 0.000 
(0.000) (0.959) (0.045) (0.666) (0.986) 
Relative Wealth: Asset Value 
Rank within Village 
0.088*** -0.037 0.009 0.006 0.019 
(0.000) (0.200) (0.783) (0.891) (0.105) 
Household with Farm Income 
0.013 -0.040** 0.067*** 0.048* 0.010 
(0.414) (0.032) (0.003) (0.091)  (0.221) 
Household with Income from 
Non-farm Business 
0.005 0.000 0.024 0.011 0.007 
(0.684) (0.984) (0.198) (0.647) (0.278) 
Female Household Head 
0.054** 0.172*** 0.099*** 0.036 0.006 
(0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.340) (0.614) 
HH Adults 
0.001 0.012*** -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
(0.654) (0.000) (0.267) (0.552) (0.421) 
Recent Economic Hardship  
(Crop, Job or Income Loss) 
0.031** 0.038** 0.030 0.024 0.006 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.103) (0.286) (0.341) 
Household migrated in the last 
two yrs to this community 
-0.219*** -0.023 -0.017 -0.188 -0.025** 
(0.000) (0.750) (0.840) (0.174) (0.018)   
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Continued… Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
 
Village Characteristics 
Rural 
0.005 -0.001 0.063** -0.056* 0.016* 
(0.791) (0.998) (0.013) (0.057) (0.088) 
Population Size 
-0.003 -0.006 0.005 0.004 0.001 
(0.505) (0.275) (0.451) (0.586) (0.521) 
Average HH Asset Value 
0.024** -0.004 -0.035** -0.019 -0.007 
(0.025) (0.742) (0.020) (0.306) (0.189) 
Within-Village Gini Index of 
Asset Inequality 
-0.131 0.123* -0.028 -0.012 -0.054* 
(0.032) (0.100) (0.757) (0.914) (0.053) 
Index of Ethnic Polarization 
0.134*** 0.160*** 0.077* 0.019 0.056*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.062) (0.685) (0.001) 
 
Conflict Coefficients 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.086*** -0.098*** -0.053** -0.046* -0.014** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.064) (0.027) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.094*** -0.129*** -0.093** -0.107* 0.013 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.054) (0.320) 
 
Province and Time Dummies 
Jakartae 
-0.144*** -0.202*** -0.173*** -0.181*** -0.037*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
West Java 
-0.148*** -0.134*** -0.020 -0.052 -0.016** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.462) (0.171) (0.037) 
East Java 
-0.053*** -0.149*** -0.123*** -0.073* -0.005** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.087) (0.037) 
Nusa Tenggara Barat 
-0.078*** 0.121*** 0.057*** 0.023* -0.005 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.087) (0.626) 
South Sulawesi 
-0.158*** -0.206*** -0.268*** -0.046 -0.016 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.369) (0.130) 
Year 2000 
-0.205*** -0.202*** -0.173*** -0.181*** -0.053*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 12100 8628 3414 2851 3195 
Individuals 8601 5481 2760 2381 2754 
Average Obs. per Individual 1.407 1.574 1.237 1.197 1.160 
Rho 0.405 0.304 0.078 0.232 0.604 
RE Logit Regression. Reported: marginal effects at mean values. Conditional on activity existence at village level. Longitudinal 
personal weights used. P-values in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
a Reference category: Age Group 15-24 Years,  b Reference category: Primary education;  
c Reference category: Individuals not working, d Reference category: 2nd and 3rd Quantile.  
e Reference category: Central Java. 
 
Table 6: Ethnicity and the Effect of Ethnic Polarization in Conflict Areas 
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
Village Characteristics 
Index of Ethnic Polarization 
0.40** 0.49*** 0.23 0.25 1.18** 
(0.022) (0.007) (0.362) (0.396) (0.013) 
Conflict Variables 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.51*** -0.47*** -0.35*** -0.13 -0.62** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.382) (0.012) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.88*** -0.93*** -0.40 -0.78* -0.85 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.140) (0.053) (0.112) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Polarization 
0.33** 0.22 0.28 -0.29 0.53 
(0.020) (0.144) (0.193) (0.240) (0.205) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Polarization 
0.69*** 0.65** 0.01 0.31 1.96*** 
(0.005) (0.011) (0.969) (0.497) (0.002) 
RE Logit Regression. Reported: coefficient estimates. Apart from the conflict*high polarization interaction variables, the 
same control variables as in Table 5 are included.  
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Table 7: Mean Participation Probabilities  
I. LOW ETHNIC POLARIZATION 
Activity 
Low Conflict Intensity Districts High Conflict Intensity Districts 
“No Violence” 
Counterfactual 
Mean 
Participation 
Probability 
Relative 
Difference: 
Violence to 
Peace (%) 
“No Violence” 
Counterfactual 
Mean 
Participation 
Probability 
Relative 
Difference: 
Violence to 
Peace (%) 
Local Governance 
34.0 26.5 -7.6 29.8 18.3 -11.5 
(0.46) (0.41) (0.06) (1.30) (1.01) (0.35) 
Social Services 
44.4 35.6 -8.8 38.6 23.2 -15.4 
(0.47) (0.44) (0.05) (1.48) (1.14) (0.41) 
Infrastructure Development 
75.6 69.6 -6.1 71.0 63.4 -7.7 
(0.52) (0.58) (0.07) (1.72) (1.86) (0.19) 
Neighborhood Security Group 
66.9 64.9 -2.0 61.9 47.0 -14.9 
(0.97) (0.98) (0.02) (3.35) (3.27) (0.50) 
Cooperatives 
9.1 5.8 -3.4 4.7 2.2 -2.5 
(0.48) (0.36) (0.13) (0.56) (0.29) (0.27) 
II. HIGH ETHNIC POLARIZATION 
Activity 
Low Conflict Intensity Districts High Conflict Intensity Districts 
“No Violence” 
Counterfactual 
Mean 
Participation 
Probability 
Relative 
Difference: 
Violence to 
Peace (%) 
“No Violence” 
Counterfactual 
Mean 
Participation 
Probability 
Relative 
Difference: 
Violence to 
Peace (%) 
Local Governance 
42.2 39.2 -3.0 24.9 22.4 -2.5 
(0.78) (0.77) (0.03) (0.69) (0.65) (0.04) 
Social Services 
52.9 48.1 -4.8 31.3 26.5 -4.8 
(0.82) (0.81) (0.05) (0.77) (0.70) (0.08) 
Infrastructure Development 
74.0 73.0 -1.0 48.7 40.3 -8.4 
(0.89) (0.91) (0.02) (0.87) (0.84) (0.08) 
Neighborhood Security Group 
76.7 70.2 -6.5 64.0 54.8 -9.3 
(1.02) (1.14) (0.15) (1.63) (1.69) (0.16) 
Cooperatives 
15.1 14.2 -0.9 2.1 5.5 3.4 
(1.12) (1.08) (0.05) (0.17) (0.40) (0.23) 
Mean Estimations. Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
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Table 8: Ethnicity and the Impact of Group Participation Rates 
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
Ethnicity Variables 
Population Share of one‟s own Ethnicity 
in the Village 
0.48** 0.35* 0.38 0.39 0.36 
(0.012) (0.070) (0.111) (0.199) (0.499) 
Relative Participation Shares Own vs. 
Other Ethnic Groups  
0.60*** 0.15 0.13 0.53 4.77*** 
(0.000) (0.277) (0.591) (0.116) (0.000) 
Index of Ethnic Polarization 
0.37** 0.41** 0.22 0.30 0.65 
(0.037) (0.022) (0.381) (0.301) (0.176) 
Conflict Variables 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.50*** -0.49*** -0.35*** -0.12 -0.60** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.422) (0.015) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.89*** -0.91*** -0.41 -0.78* -0.63 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.131) (0.054) (0.233) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Polarization 
0.32** 0.21 0.29 -0.30 0.86** 
(0.028) (0.170) (0.176) (0.214) (0.044) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Polarization 
0.49* 0.52** 0.00 0.24 1.49** 
(0.051) (0.043) (0.996) (0.599) (0.024) 
IA: Low Intensity x High Polarization x 
Rel. PA Share Own Ethnic Group 
-0.12 0.80* -0.26 -0.21 -2.87 
(0.722) (0.093) (0.672) (0.736) (0.310) 
IA: High Intensity x High Polarization x 
Rel PA Share Own Ethnic Group 
1.15** 1.89*** 1.24 -2.03 1.88 
(0.030) (0.003) (0.118) (0.235) (0.492) 
RE Logit Regression. Reported: coefficient estimates. Other than the variable on the relative participation share of the 
own ethnic group and the conflict interaction variables, the same control variables as in Table 5 are included.  
 
Table 9: Participation Probabilities – by Relative Participation of the Own Ethnic Group 
► HIGH ETHNIC POLARIZATION AND HIGH CONFLICT INTENSITY 
Activity 
Relative Participation Share 
of own Group: <0 
Relative Participation Share 
of own Group: [0, 0.25] 
High Relative Participation 
of own Group: >0.25 
“No Violence” 
Counterfactual 
Actual 
Participation 
Probability 
“No Violence” 
Counterfactual 
Actual 
Participation 
Probability 
“No Violence” 
Counterfactual 
Actual 
Participation 
Probability 
Local Governance 
26.2 19.4 24.6 20.9 34.6 36.1 
(1.04) (0.89) (1.10) (1.02) (1.98) (1.99) 
Social Services 
30.6 20.9 32.3 29.0 40.3 44.4 
(0.96) (0.75) (1.40) (1.34) (2.41) (2.50) 
Infrastructure Development 
45.4 34.0 53.7 47.3 45.4 46.8 
(1.08) (0.95) (1.50) (1.51) (2.51) (2.64) 
Neighborhood Security Group 
66.0 59.5 61.1 48.0   
(2.09) (2.15) (2.63) (2.79)   
Cooperatives 
1.5 3.2 2.3 5.7 7.7 20.5 
(0.15) (0.31) (0.38) (0.87) (1.04) (2.20) 
Mean Estimations. Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
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Table 10: Effects of Other Individual Characteristics in Conflict Areas 
I. HIGHER EDUCATION 
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.096*** -0.103*** -0.051** -0.051* -0.018** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.077) (0.010) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.092*** -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.100 -0.007 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.115) (0.528) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
Secondary Education or More 
0.046 0.024 -0.007 0.014 0.019 
(0.121) (0.556) (0.859) (0.780) (0.230) 
IA: High Intensity x  
Secondary Education or More 
-0.002 0.009 0.077* -0.015 0.080*** 
(0.989) (0.866) (0.098) (0.834) (0.006) 
II. LOW ASSETS 
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.089*** -0.116*** -0.061*** -0.054** -0.015** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.044) (0.026) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.094*** -0.146*** -0.046 -0.118** 0.018 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.262) (0.039) (0.166) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
Low Assets (25th per cent.) 
0.015 0.081** 0.035 0.030 0.006 
(0.612) (0.011) (0.351) (0.489) (0.661) 
IA: High Intensity x  
Low Assets  (25th per cent.) 
0.000 0.094* -0.163*** 0.038 -0.014 
(0.966) (0.091) (0.007) (0.614) (0.353) 
III. HIGH ASSETS 
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.095*** -0.091*** -0.070*** -0.044 -0.015** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.110) (0.029) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.087*** -0.122*** -0.132*** -0.046 -0.003 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.408) (0.831) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Assets (25th per cent.) 
0.035 -0.031 0.055 -0.008 0.005 
(0.174) (0.330) (0.121) (0.864) (0.680) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Assets  (25th per cent.) 
-0.020 -0.029 0.092** -0.194** 0.054** 
(0.635) (0.572) (0.035) (0.024) (0.028) 
Each pair of coefficients from a different regression (control variables as in Table 5). Reported: coefficient estimates. 
P-values in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 11: Linear RE Model: Estimates for the Ethnicity and Conflict Variables 
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
Conflict and Conflict*Ethnic Polarization-Interaction Variables 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.07*** -0.08*** -0.05** -0.02 -0.04*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.397) (0.009) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.10*** -0.14*** -0.07 -0.14** -0.03 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.185) (0.029) (0.283) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Polarization 
0.04** 0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.04 
(0.031) (0.110) (0.388) (0.185) (0.197) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Polarization 
0.08*** 0.10** -0.05 0.06 0.11*** 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.422) (0.389) (0.003) 
Linear RE Regression. Reported: coefficient estimates. The same control variables as in Table 6 are included.  
P-values in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 12: Instrumental Variables: Estimates for the Ethnicity and Conflict Variables 
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
Conflict and Conflict*Ethnic Polarization-Interaction Variables 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.16*** -0.17*** -0.11 -0.10 -0.07 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.281) (0.308) (0.160) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.45*** -0.46*** -0.11 -0.09 -0.20** 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.553) (0.648) (0.032) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Polarization 
0.59*** 0.65*** 0.36 0.22 0.14 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.218) (0.351) (0.189) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Polarization 
0.69*** 0.69*** 0.11 0.06 0.33*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.658) (0.827) (0.006) 
RE GLS Regression. Reported: coefficient estimates. The same control variables as in Table 6 are included.  
Instruments included: (1): Share of neighboring districts with 1-9 conflict-related fatalities, (2): share of neighboring 
districts with 10 or more conflict-related fatalities; (3): IA (1)*high polarization; (4): IA (2)*high polarization;  
(5)-(8): squared terms of (1)-(4). 
P-values in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 13: Linear RE Model: Relative Participation of the Own Ethnic Group 
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
Conflict and Conflict*Ethnic Polarization-Interaction Variables 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.06*** -0.08*** -0.05** -0.02 -0.05*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.425) (0.009) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.10*** -0.14*** -0.07 -0.13** -0.03 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.169) (0.043) (0.292) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Polarization 
0.04** 0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.08** 
(0.045) (0.145) (0.265) (0.233) (0.019) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Polarization 
0.06* 0.08** -0.05 0.05 0.11*** 
(0.069) (0.036) (0.393) (0.503) (0.007) 
IA: Low Intensity x High Polarization x 
Rel. PA Share Own Ethnic Group 
-0.01 0.13* -0.04 -0.03 -0.19 
(0.892) (0.084) (0.715) (0.728) (0.431) 
IA: High Intensity x High Polarization x 
Rel PA Share Own Ethnic Group 
0.12* 0.29*** 0.28* -0.36 0.15 
(0.089) (0.004) (0.052) (0.179) (0.478) 
Linear RE Regression. Reported: coefficient estimates. The same control variables as in Table 8 are included.   
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Table 14: Instrumental Variables: Relative Participation of the Own Ethnic Group 
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
Conflict and Conflict*Ethnic Polarization-Interaction Variables 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.16*** -0.17*** -0.11 -0.12 -0.02 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.249) (0.242) (0.811) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.47*** -0.45*** -0.14 -0.07 -0.13 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.452) (0.742) (0.219) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Polarization 
0.58*** 0.67*** 0.41 0.30 0.14 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.143) (0.155) (0.180) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Polarization 
0.70*** 0.67*** 0.15 0.04 0.28** 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.511) (0.879) (0.023) 
IA: Low Intensity x High Polarization x 
Rel. PA Share Own Ethnic Group 
0.16 0.03 -0.06 -0.12 -1.02 
(0.516) (0.948) (0.742) (0.571) (0.262) 
IA: High Intensity x High Polarization x 
Rel PA Share Own Ethnic Group 
0.18 0.49*** 0.45** -0.73 -0.54 
(0.113) (0.002) (0.014) (0.319) (0.169) 
RE GLS Regression. Reported: coefficient estimates. The same control variables as in Table 8 are included.  
Instruments included: (1): Share of neighboring districts with 1-9 conflict-related fatalities, (2): share of neighboring districts 
with 10 or more conflict-related fatalities; (3): IA (1)*high polarization; (4): IA (2)*high polarization; (5): IA (3)*Rel. 
participation own ethnic group; (6): IA (4)*Rel. participation own ethnic group;(7)-(12): squared terms of (1)-(6). 
P-values in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Figure 1: Total Number of Fatalities in the Sample, 1990-2003 
 
Source: UNSFIR-II Database. Based on own calculations. The May Riots in Jakarta in 1998, which account for 1,188 fatalities, are 
excluded here. 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Fatal Violence in the Sampleof Districts (1998-1999) 
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Table A1: Alternative Specifications – Conflict and Ethnic Polarization 
I. SUB-SAMPLE: JAKARTA EXCLUDED 
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.106*** -0.115*** -0.057** -0.032 -0.020** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.294) (0.025) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.149*** -0.202*** -0.057 -0.235** -0.025** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.336) (0.040) (0.022) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Polarization 
0.074** 0.064 0.052 -0.029 0.025 
(0.041) (0.107) (0.190) (0.600) (0.342) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Polarization 
0.178** 0.256*** -0.168 0.137** 0.249 
(0.022) (0.001) (0.173) (0.048) (0.123) 
II. SUB-SAMPLE: JAVA ONLY 
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.104*** -0.108*** -0.071*** -0.025 -0.019** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.661) (0.028) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.170*** -0.194*** -0.084 -0.171* -0.023 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.107) (0.055) (0.248) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Polarization 
0.080** 0.052** 0.054 -0.065** 0.022 
(0.030) (0.024) (0.104) (0.029) (0.627) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Polarization 
0.167*** 0.159*** 0.004 0.050 0.139** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.856) (0.482) (0.012) 
III. 5-FATALITIES THRESHOLD 
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
Low Intensity: 1-4 Fatalities 
-0.111*** -0.106*** -0.068*** -0.043 -0.017** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.159) (0.029) 
High Intensity: ≥ 5 Fatalities 
-0.081*** -0.160*** -0.091** 0.025 -0.027*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.041) (0.661) (0.010) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Polarization 
0.072** 0.054 0.055 -0.044 0.020 
(0.031) (0.155) (0.165) (0.405) (0.356) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Polarization 
0.077* 0.108** 0.010 -0.111 0.133** 
(0.081) (0.038) (0.852) (0.197) (0.045) 
IV. CONTINUOUS INDICATOR: NUMBER OF FATALITIES 
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
Number of Fatalities 
-0.003* -0.005** -0.008*** -0.001 0.001 
(0.053) (0.031) (0.001) (0.695) (0.216) 
Number of Fatalities 
Squared 
0.000 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000 0.000* 
(0.178) (0.093) (0.001) (0.761) (0.098) 
Interaction Fatalities and 
Polarization 
0.002* 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 
(0.094) (0.133) (0.310) (0.852) (0.511) 
V. WHOLE SAMPLE (NOT RESTRICTED TO INFORMED INDIVIDUALS) 
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.060*** -0.106*** -0.065*** -0.033* -0.008** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.068) (0.049) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.086*** -0.176*** -0.075** -0.099** -0.017*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.035) (0.003) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Polarization 
0.086*** 0.092*** 0.024 0.028 0.005 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.319) (0.196) (0.426) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Polarization 
0.141*** 0.232*** 0.045 0.192* 0.054* 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.349) (0.062) (0.078) 
VI. ETHNIC FRAGMENTATION  
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.093*** -0.084*** -0.072** -0.071* -0.019* 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.028) (0.096) (0.054) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.131*** -0.199*** 0.034 -0.396*** -0.025* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.613) (0.008) (0.059) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
Ethnic HHI >0 
0.015 -0.018 0.023 0.033 0.009 
(0.539) (0.534) (0.505) (0.442) (0.522) 
IA: High Intensity x  
Ethnic HHI >0 
0.075 0.137** -0.173* 0.198*** 0.122 
(0.192) (0.039) (0.075) (0.003) (0.141) 
Each pair of coefficients from a different regression (control variables as in Table 5). Reported: coefficient estimates. 
P-values in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table A2: The Effect of Relative Ethnic Participation Shares – All Conflict Areas 
DV: Participation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Governance Social Service Infrastructure Security Cooperatives 
Population Share of one‟s own 
Ethnicity in the Village 
0.47** 0.36* 0.35 0.42 0.32 
(0.014) (0.060) (0.139) (0.164) (0.553) 
Relation Participation Shares Own 
vs. Other Ethnic Groups  
0.67*** 0.21 0.03 0.29 5.41*** 
(0.000) (0.167) (0.926) (0.438) (0.000) 
Index of Ethnic Polarization 
0.61*** 0.65*** 0.37* 0.12 1.24*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.079) (0.607) (0.003) 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.40*** -0.44*** -0.28** -0.24* -0.17 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.054) (0.469) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.73*** -0.59*** -0.51*** -0.51** 0.30 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.035) (0.415) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
Rel. PA Own Ethnic Group 
-0.26 0.07 0.15 0.47 -3.63 
(0.245) (0.794) (0.718) (0.393) (0.123) 
IA: High Intensity x  
Rel PA Own Ethnic Group 
1.33*** 0.52 1.36* -2.01 1.30 
(0.007) (0.218) (0.082) (0.188) (0.627) 
RE Logit Regression. Other than the variable on the relative participation share of the own ethnic group and the conflict 
interaction variables, the same control variables as in Table 5 are included. Reported: coefficient estimates.  
P-values in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table A3: Socio-economic Characteristics of Participants: Group Means and 
Population Deviations 
Variable Governance Social Services Infrastructure Security Groups Cooperatives 
Group Means 
Age 
38.82 34.16 38.05 38.13 40.61 
(5.39) (5.11) (6.39) (6.39) (7.14) 
HH Eq. Consumption 
91.17 85.11 84.02 88.65 99.19 
(48.85) (47.12) (51.64) (63.47) (58.35) 
Education Attainment (1-5) 
2.88 2.68 2.88 2.79 3.14 
(0.64) (0.61) (0.71) (0.72) (0.81) 
Average Difference from the Group Mean (absolute values)-  PARTICIPANTS 
Age 
9.92 8.67 10.69 9.49 7.52 
(7.32) (6.77) (7.65) (6.99) (6.11) 
HH Eq. Consumption 
42.84 38.94 37.30 39.15 40.33 
(57.94) (53.29) (52.48) (53.79) (51.06) 
Education Attainment (1-5) 
0.77 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.71 
(0.56) (0.55) (0.54) (0.54) (0.56) 
Differences from the Group Mean (absolute values)- NON-PARTICIPANTS 
Age 
13.84 13.83 14.84 16.99 14.02 
(8.69) (9.44) (8.81) (8.83) (9.44) 
HH Eq. Consumption 
44.49 43.29 48.79 49.15 54.56 
(57.21) (80.87) (64.99) (74.63) (64.63) 
Education Attainment (1-5) 
0.84 0.86 0.83 0.86 0.97 
(0.60) (0.63) (0.62) (0.64) (0.76) 
Mean Values. Standard Deviations in Parentheses. 
 
 
